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Stewart: Review of Boyle on Cavendish

Boyle, Deborah. The Well-Ordered Universe: The Philosophy of Margaret
Cavendish. Oxford University Press, 2018. 273 pp. ISBN 978-0-1902-3480-5.
Reviewed by Dustin D. Stewart
Columbia University
A carrot knows it’s a carrot, and it knows the rules it has to follow to be good at
carrothood. The conical bundle of matter that we call a carrot is, in the words of
philosopher Deborah Boyle, aware of itself and its rightful orientation to the world:
it recognizes “what the norms are for behaving under various circumstances; it has
knowledge of what it is to be a carrot—that is, of the nature of carrots” (240).
Although any given carrot has a capacity for choice and some measure of freedom
to break the rules, unlike human beings it hardly ever does so. That’s why carrot
life, as opposed to human life, stays harmonious.
Ignorance is no excuse if every creature—every composite of living matter, each
slice of which “has perception and knowledge” (76)—innately knows the right way
to act. Nonhuman creatures may on rare occasions be impeded from living
normally, and perhaps they grow a bit bored of harmony now and then. Yet human
beings have a stronger reason for disobeying the standards set by nature to govern
their actions. “Humans,” explains Boyle, “possess a desire for fame, a desire that is
simply not present in other creatures, and, because of this, humans are much more
likely than other creatures not to behave as they ought” (118). Self-love in other
living things fosters unity, but it becomes corrupt in human beings who, anxious
about mortality, seek public recognition as “sort of a substitute for continued
existence” after death (133). Pursuing it has the effect of spoiling most of their
social arrangements in this life, public as well as private. Bundles of wayward
human matter ought to know what their rightful place is and how to inhabit it. To
offset their ruinous desire for fame, though, they have to cooperate through politics,
defined as “a formal system of rules specifying those roles, as well as officials who
can enforce the rules” (151). People need “a strong central government—preferably
with an absolute sovereign—as well as clearly delineated, hierarchical classes and
roles so that the various members of society know how to behave appropriately”
(142). Political life at its best, which here means its most hierarchical, can give
human existence at least a little of the stability that both matter and nature require.
Boyle is describing the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673). Whether
the picture she draws in her major new study is revisionist will depend on which
version of her subject her readers have been led to expect. That the prolific
seventeenth-century writer and sometime political exile was royalist and rankobsessed in her thinking will not surprise literary critics who have followed the
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historicist work on Cavendish that has proliferated over the past fifteen years or so.
Boyle writes as a philosopher primarily addressing others in her discipline, it must
be allowed, and so it makes sense that almost nothing of this scholarship appears in
her footnotes. And yet her findings mostly affirm earlier literary interpretations that
treat Cavendish’s royalism as (to borrow a phrase from Julie Crawford) a complex
“ideology of hierarchical order.” For readers familiar with this framework, the big
takeaway from The Well-Ordered Universe will be a deepened awareness of just
how many of Cavendish’s philosophical positions boil down to order, obedience,
even normativity. (One potential objection might indeed be that too many of the
positions come packaged in such terms. Though Boyle alerts readers that she does
not “mean to reduce [Cavendish’s] complicated philosophical views to a single
factor” (11), the stress on hierarchy does often seem a key to any possible lock.)
A different set of readers, meanwhile, will find more to argue with in Boyle’s
treatment. A lively strand of interdisciplinary work on Cavendish highlights what
is variously called her vitalist or panpsychist materialism, and, in the wake of
influential books by John Rogers, Lisa Sarasohn, and (most recently) Jonathan
Kramnick, some interpreters have been inclined to see Cavendish as a philosopher
of freedom, bravely rejecting human exceptionalism by ascribing movement,
knowledge, and experience to everything that exists in the natural world. (In
Sarasohn’s view, as Boyle quotes her in saying, Cavendish wants to secure “the
fundamental liberty of all creatures” [33].) Strongly opposed to such a portrait,
Boyle maintains again and again that “when freedom threatens order, Cavendish
typically treats order as the higher good” (38). Without quite saying so, the book
pushes back against a tendency, perhaps less prevalent among philosophers than
certain object-oriented literary and cultural theorists, to equate materialist thought
as such with some kind of political radicalism or egalitarianism. It doesn’t take
much reading of Thomas Hobbes to know that materialism can push in authoritarian
directions as well, and Boyle’s Cavendish belongs squarely with Hobbes (and with
William Davenant, whose poem Gondibert (1651) pops up several times) and not
with Spinoza. The subject of the present study goes further than Hobbes does, in
fact, to naturalize differences of rank and to dress obedience to authority in the
language of liberty.
Several negative conclusions follow from the case that Cavendish subordinates
freedom to order, with Boyle taking some satisfaction in popping bubbly notions
that the early modern author shares progressive social views held by her modern
readers. For one thing, Boyle insists, Cavendish was no feminist. Neither, for
another, was she any kind of environmentalist.
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Extending a discussion of the author’s “deeply conservative” perspective on social
class (163), the seventh chapter (“Gender Roles and the Roles of Nature”) proposes
that Cavendish’s ideas about gender were more consistent and more conventional
than scholars have cared to admit. Unfortunately, this is the most disappointing part
of the book, the trouble being that the real-life Cavendish and several of her
fictional characters emerge as striking exceptions to the traditional feminine roles
and virtues celebrated elsewhere in her writing. Cavendish likewise seems to be
talking about other people, not herself, when she discusses the trouble with desiring
fame. Boyle never succeeds in explaining away this problem of exceptionality,
though she does try, contending that the women who perform masculinity in The
Blazing World (1666) and Bell in Campo (1662) are actually failures who reinforce
conservative norms and that Cavendish’s own outlandish “cross-dressing,” in her
writing no less than her wardrobe, was not finally “contrary to feminine virtue”
(174). Perhaps more attention to the work on Cavendish’s literary-historical context
may have been helpful here. Instead of agreeing that Cavendish wasn’t perverse or
non-normative in her performance of gender, these studies indicate that she saw her
perversity as sanctioned by her aristocratic standing, the sort of freedom made
possible (though only for a few) within a rigid hierarchy. At any rate, the chapter
on gender leans rather heavily on criticism and theory from the 1980s and ’90s, a
tendency that becomes problematic when Boyle takes up Cavendish’s stance on
hermaphroditism. Here again the reader is asked to prioritize what the writer
sometimes says over what she frequently does.
The chapter also betrays some limitations of Boyle’s methodology, to which I am
otherwise highly sympathetic. As she explains in a footnote early on, “if
inconsistencies in Cavendish’s writings can be resolved by appeal to her other texts,
then that reading is preferable to leaving the conflict unresolved” (22, note 59). One
of the book’s foremost achievements lies in its refusal to accept an old picture of
Cavendish as a hopelessly erratic thinker. Most of Boyle’s footnotes refer readers
from one Cavendish text to another (if not two more), and her ambitious strategy,
wading through everything her subject wrote in an effort to pin down what she
really thought, works best in three early chapters on Cavendish’s conception of
nature and the evolution of her theory of matter. Running from Chapter 2 through
Chapter 4, and dealing especially with Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1655,
1663), Philosophical Letters (1664), Observations upon Experimental Philosophy
(1666), and Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668), this material constitutes the
heart of the book. Particularly illuminating are sections analyzing Cavendish’s
claims that different sorts of matter are arrayed hierarchically (64-72), that nature
is eternal yet somehow distinct from God (78-83), and that causation is reconcilable
with free will (97-104). Her theory of occasional causation holds, in brief, that when
one ball strikes another, the second ball doesn’t receive motion from the first but
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moves by its own power. The first ball may entice the second, yes, and the second
may opt to imitate the first, but it isn’t impelled to do so. This theory has wideranging implications, as later chapters show, helping to clarify Cavendish’s model
of sensory perception and her partly Galenist understanding of health and sickness.
According to Cavendish, it is not the case that a disease agent directly causes
sickness; rather, its movements are imitated by parts of the host’s body, which in
the misguided act of imitation make themselves ill.
Yet the writer’s fiction, whether presented in verse, prose, or drama, often proves
resistant to the philosopher’s impressively orderly approach to conflict resolution.
Sometimes Boyle decides which voice in a polyvocal literary text best reflects
Cavendish’s own opinions, diminishing the formal significance of the polyvocality
along the way, though sometimes she is forced to concede that strange things can
happen in imaginative writing that do not fit very neatly into a coherent
philosophical system: “what Cavendish says about the creatures in the imaginary
worlds may not be applicable to those in our world” (205). Fiction keeps situating
itself at the limits of order, and yet Cavendish rarely shied away from bringing some
of the transgressive strangeness out of the worlds she imagined and into the real
one in which she lived. Questions linger as to what happens when those of us who
read Cavendish’s fiction immerse ourselves in her inventions—whether we become
participants in or mere witnesses to her aristocratic freedom from constraint,
relative and qualified though that freedom must be. It is consoling to think that we
too are able to test matter’s boundaries and challenge nature’s norms in our reading,
building fantastical realms that follow different rules. But Boyle’s Cavendish might
be using that very dream to condition us to remain good carrots, mindful that we
ought not to imitate her dazzling mobility but should accept our proper place in the
ground, waiting to be consumed.
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